Yes. Future facilities need proof systems that separate tested performance from ordinary code compliance and marketing language. Until certification can make that distinction credibly, owners and insurers cannot reward genuine security, and the market for secure infrastructure stays limited.
Code compliance is not enough for consequence
Building code protects against many ordinary hazards, but machine-age facilities carry a different burden. AI infrastructure, data centers, secure energy systems, critical communications, and civic continuity rooms need an assurance model that addresses intentional attack, cascading dependency, operational continuity, and evidence.
Certification should connect product, installation, and use case
A secure envelope is not just a material. It includes mix design, geometry, installation, reinforcement, access design, openings, inspections, and documentation. The coming market will need certification pathways that help owners distinguish tested performance from unsupported claims.
Training makes certification usable
Certification without field literacy becomes paperwork. Designers, installers, inspectors, owners, and responders need shared language for physical security, access delay, blast exposure, ballistic risk, electromagnetic concerns, and cyber-physical dependency. That is where security-construction education can make standards more executable.
Assurance is part of competitiveness
The United States cannot build secure AI and energy infrastructure with ordinary compliance language alone. Mission assurance requires evidence: what was specified, who installed it, how it was tested, where it is vulnerable, and how the facility should respond when systems fail.
The common thread is consequence. A facility that hosts critical machines, public services, energy systems, or security functions should be treated as an operating system made from people, material, software, and evidence.